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IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIES FOR THE MODEL LAW ON 
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: THE DIVERGENCE IN ASIA-
PACIFIC AND LESSONS FOR UNCITRAL 




The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (“Model Law”) 
was conceived with the aim of providing a framework for States to obtain 
consistency in the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and granting 
relief in aid of the foreign courts. The Model Law has achieved moderate success 
internationally and four states in the Asia-Pacific, namely Australia, Singapore, 
Japan and Korea, have enacted legislation based on the Model Law. Scholars 
agree on the importance of consistent implementation of the Model Law in 
managing cross-border insolvency to achieve quick, certain, and predictable 
outcomes.  
However, the Model Law’s aims have not been completely met and existing 
accounts have pointed out that there is a lack of complete harmonization for two 
reasons. First, States have not fully implemented the Model Law in their 
domestic law. Second, the judiciary in the States have not interpreted their 
legislation enacting the Model Law consistently. This lack of harmony is 
reflected in the fact that UNCITRAL recently felt the need to promulgate a 
supplemental Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-
Related Judgments. 
In this Article, we examine the divergent implementation strategies of the 
Model Law in Australia, Singapore, Japan, and Korea, and explain the reasons 
for the divergence. In the case of Japan and Korea, legal origins have been put 
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forward as a reason for the divergence; as these two jurisdictions are not based 
on common law, they require greater local modification to assure the Model 
Law will fit into their legal systems. However, we argue that legal origins are 
incomplete reasons for the lack of uniformity. Instead, we argue that where 
States, like Australia and Singapore, are shifting from a moderately territorialist 
approach with cross-border insolvency to the modified universalist approach as 
envisaged by the Model Law, they are more likely to implement the Model Law 
in full. Where States start from an exclusively territorialist approach (such as 
Japan and Korea), they are likely to recognize foreign insolvency proceedings 
as a broad signal of their international commitment towards adopting global 
norms, but would demand changes to allow for some room to depart from all of 
the consequences of recognition of foreign proceedings, even in situations where 
there may be no real impediment for the Model Law to be implemented. 
However, insofar as Korea is concerned, there are signs that judicial attitudes 
are changing as the judiciary sees the benefits of the Model Law in cooperation 
and communication, and there may be a greater chance of implementation.  
Our study illustrates the limitations of achieving the objectives of the Model 
Law. We argue that when determining the strategies for uniform implementation 
of UNCITRAL, in the context of “soft law,” we should take into account the 
importance of signalling effect and path dependency to the countries, which will 
have implications for other jurisdictions considering the adoption of the Model 
Law or the supplementary Model Law on insolvency-related judgments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the rise of multi-state enterprises and the rising complexities in 
resolving cross-border insolvencies, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
(Model Law)1 was conceived in 1997 with the aim of providing a framework for 
countries to adopt so as to obtain consistency in the recognition of foreign 
insolvency proceedings and granting relief in aid of the foreign courts, giving 
foreign creditors or foreign representatives access to local courts and 
cooperation between courts in countries where the debtor’s assets are located. 
The objective of the Model Law is facilitating, to the maximum extent possible, 
the optimal management of cross-border insolvency, so as to benefit debtors, 
creditors and other stakeholders, as well as the economies in which these 
stakeholders function. The Model Law has achieved moderate success 
internationally, with major common law jurisdictions including the United 
Kingdom (UK),2 the United States (US),3 Australia4 and more recently, 
Singapore,5 having changed their domestic laws on cross-border insolvency 
cooperation based on the Model Law provisions.6 Japan7 and Korea8 have also 
 
 1 G.A. Res. A/RES/52/158, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Jan. 30, 1998).  
 2 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations (CBIR) 2006, SI 2006/1030, (UK), introduced via the Insolvency 
Act 2000, ch. 39, §14 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/39/pdfs/ukpga_20000039_en.pdf. 
 3 Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C §§1501 – 1532 (2012).  
 4 Cross-Border Insolvency Act, 2008 (Austl.) (where § 6 states that the Model Law, subject to some 
modifications, has the force of law in Australia). 
 5 Companies Act 2006, ch.50, Sch. 10 (Sing.), (effective May 2017). The 2017 reforms to the Companies 
Act which incorporate, among others, the Model Law, draw on the recommendations made by Singapore’s 
Insolvency Law Review Committee (ILRC) in its report in 2013, but more directly on those made in the 
subsequent report of the Committee to Strengthen Singapore as an International Centre for Debt Restructuring 
(Restructuring Committee) in 2016. See INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY 
LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE: FINAL REPORT (Ministry of Law, 2013), 
https://app.mlaw.gov.sg/files/news/announcements/2013/10/ReportoftheInsolvencyLawReviewCommittee.pdf 
, (2013 Report) (last visited October 11, 2019); COMMITTEE TO STRENGTHEN SINGAPORE AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
CENTRE FOR DEBT RESTRUCTURING, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (Ministry of Law, 2016), 
https://app.mlaw.gov.sg/files/news/public-consultations/2016/04/Final%20DR%20Report.pdf , (2016 Report) 
(last visited October 11, 2019). 
 6 As of July 2018, 44 States have adopted the Model Law: UNCITRAL, Overview of the Status of the 
UNCITRAL Conventions and Model Laws (1997) (2018), 
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/overview-status-table_2.pdf (last 
visited October 11, 2019). 
 7 Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings Law, No. 129 of 2000 
(Japan). An unofficial English translation by Junichi Matsushita and Stacy Steele of the Law Relating to 
Recognition and Assistance for Foreign Insolvency Proceedings is available at 
https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/12-_Japanese_insolvency_law_129_of_2000.pdf (last visited 
October 11, 2019). 
 8 Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (Act No. 7428, March 2005, as amended) (S. Korea) 
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enacted legislation that is based on the Model Law, albeit with adaptations and 
modifications.  
The goals of the Model Law are certainty, predictability, and speed in 
obtaining recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and coordination of 
those proceedings, so as to protect the debtor’s assets for maximum distribution 
to the creditors.9 By having a uniform framework, the Model Law “provides a 
well-understood framework for foreign parties and reduces the need for foreign 
representatives to have to seek advice on domestic law,”10 thereby reducing 
transaction costs. However, despite the ostensible adoption of the Model Law 
among the participating States, the academic literature has documented that 
there is no complete harmonization of insolvency assistance and enhanced 
cooperation for several reasons.11 First, as the Model Law is “soft law” (does 
not operate by way of a treaty), States have not implemented all of the Model 
Law provisions consistently in their domestic law, even though the Guide to the 
Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border 
Insolvency (Guide) has recommended that there should be as few deviations as 
possible.12 Second, despite the existence of the Guide, the courts in the adopting 
States have not interpreted the legislation enacting the Model Law 
consistently.13 The divergence of the implementation strategies of the Model 
Law raises the question of whether the Model Law promotes the goals of  
 
(DRBA). An English translation by the Korean Ministry of Government is available at 
http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korLawEng?pstSeq=52645 (last visited October 11, 2019).  
 9 Jay L. Westbrook, An Empirical Study of the Implementation in the United States of the Model Law on 
Cross Border Insolvency, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 250 (2013) (identifying certainty and speed as goals); see 
also UNCITRAL, GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY (2013), para. 8 (pointing out the drawbacks of the regime without a Model Law). 
 10 UNCITRAL, ‘11th Multinational Judicial Colloquium UNCITRAL-INSOL-World Bank’, (Mar. 21-
22, 2015), Report, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/EleventhJC.pdf. (last visited October 11, 2019), 
para. 33.  
 11 E.g., see generally, S. Chandra Mohan, Cross定border Insolvency Problems: Is the UNCITRAL Model 
Law the Answer?, (21), 3 INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW. 199-223 (2012); LOOK CHAN HO, CROSS 
BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, 324 (Globe Law and Business, 4th ed. 
2017). 
 12 UNCITRAL, GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY (2013) (Guide), para 20. The Guide contains the background and explanatory 
statement to the Model Law. The original Guide was issued by UNCITRAL in 1997, in conjunction with the 
adoption of the Model Law, and the Guide was revised in 2013. See generally, Look Chan Ho, The Revised 
UNCITRAL Model Law Enactment Guide – A Welcome Product?, J. I. B. L. R. 325 (2014). 
 13 But see the Judicial Perspectives document that was developed by UNCITRAL in response to requests 
from participants at biennial UNCITRAL/INSOL/World Bank multinational judicial colloquia, for more 
information on the application and interpretation of the Model Law - 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Judicial-Perspective-2013-e.pdf (last visited October 11, 
2019). The principal author is the New Zealand judge, Paul Heath, and it is intended to assist judges on questions 
arising on an application for recognition under the Model Law. It has since been revised. 
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achieving a quick, certain, and predictable outcome in cross-border insolvency 
proceedings.14 
In this paper, we examine the extent to which the Model Law has been 
enacted and implemented in four economically significant Asia-Pacific 
jurisdictions: Australia, Singapore, Korea and Japan, with the former two being 
common law countries and the latter two being civil law countries. In making 
the comparison, we take into account the theory of “functional equivalents” in 
comparative law which holds that a rule which takes a positive legal form in one 
system may be expressed in other legal systems in a different fashion.15 Further, 
we examine how the domestic legislation implementing the Model Law has been 
interpreted in Australia, Singapore and Korea.16 We seek to assess whether the 
Model Law’s goals of speed, certainty and predictability are met; the reasons 
behind the divergent implementation and interpretation of the Model Law and 
the future of the jurisprudence on the Model Law.  
Various theories have been put forth to explain the divergence in approaches 
respecting the enactment and interpretation of the Model Law. At a general level, 
one can argue the differences merely reflect the fact that insolvency policies and 
procedures differ substantially between States; Lord Millett observed that “no 
branch of the law is moulded more by considerations of national economic 
policy and commercial philosophy.”17 More specifically, in respect to the 
adoption of the Model Law by civil law jurisdictions in Asia, scholars such as 
Yamatomo have argued that the reasons for having a different strategy to 
implement the Model Law in Korea and Japan lie in the different legal origins. 
Korea and Japan follow the civil law, distinct from the common law tradition.18  
 
 14 G.A. Res. A/RES/52/158, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Jan. 30, 1998). (Model Law). The Guide has recommended that as few 
deviations be made to the Model Law as possible, so as to increase the uniformity and transparency on cross-
border insolvency and obtain cooperation from the other States, at para. 22. 
 15 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 
Clarendon Press 2d ed.1992).  
 16 For Japan, the Case Law on UNCITRAL Text (CLOUT), which contains summaries of cases on the 
Model Law, has very few English translation of the decisions on the legislation based on the Model Law in Japan 
(four): http://www.uncitral.org/clout/index.jspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2019); these decisions are not relevant for 
the purposes of this article. Checks with Japanese practitioners indicate that there is no major Japanese case law 
on the legislation implementing the Model Law. For Korea, we relied on decisions translated in CLOUT as well 
as the English translation found on the website of the Supreme Court of Korea: Supreme Court Order, [2010] 
2009Ma1600, 
https://www.scourt.go.kr/eng/supreme/decisions/NewDecisionsView.work?seq=559&pageIndex=1&mode=6
&searchWord= (last visited Jan.1, 2019).  
 17 Peter Millet, Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Approach, 6 INT. INSOLV. REV. 99, 109 (1997). 
 18 Kazuhiko Yamamoto, New Japanese Legislation on Cross-border Insolvency as Compared with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, INT. INSOLV. REV. 67, at 68-69 (2002) (arguing that in the case of Japan, the possibility 
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As attractive as the legal origin explanation appears, there are at least two 
issues with this explanation. First, while there may be provisions in the Model 
Law that would pose difficulty for civil law countries to adopt unequivocally, 
such as those provisions relating to the conferment of judicial discretion, there 
is no suggestion in the scholarly literature on Japanese or Korean jurisprudence 
that the reasons for not adopting the provisions lie in the constraints found in 
civil law traditions. In fact, the evidence shows the contrary. For example, Korea 
and Japan’s decision not to adopt the Model Law’s automatic stay following the 
recognition of foreign main proceedings does not lie in the constraints found in 
their civil law traditions.19 Further, Korea has not adopted, in full, the judicial 
cooperation and coordination in the Korean Debtor Rehabilitation and 
Bankruptcy Act in 2006 (DRBA), the legislation that implements the Model 
Law, and yet the recent Memorandum of Understanding entered into by the 
Korean courts with the Singapore and New York courts, both in common law 
countries, signal the willingness to cooperate.  
Drawing from the four jurisdictions, however, we argue that legal origins 
provide only a partial explanation for the divergence in implementation. Instead, 
the explanation is based on the divergence in the two dichotomies in approaching 
cross-border insolvency adopted by the States: universality and territoriality.20 
The universalist principle is premised on the view that only the courts of the 
bankrupt’s “home jurisdiction” have control of, and may administer, the 
bankrupt debtor’s assets and that there should only be one governing law. In 
contrast, the territorialist principle is one where each country has jurisdiction 
over the portion of the bankrupt debtor’s assets within its territory only. Thus, 
there will be multiple proceedings if the bankrupt debtor’s assets are located in 
multiple jurisdictions, and there is no obligation to recognize proceedings in the 
other jurisdictions. There are also many combinations and variations between 
the two dichotomies in practice.21 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages of either approach.22 Mervorach has argued 
that territorialist approaches by States are explained by certain universal biases 
(such as preserving the status quo and aversion to perceived loss of sovereignty 
 
of giving greater discretion to judges in the manner envisaged by the common law may cause confusion). 
 19 See Section I(B)(5) below.  
 20 Memorandum from Jay L. Westbrook to the United States National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
(July 29, 1998), Re: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/e1.pdf (last visited October 11, 2019).  
 21 Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999). 
 22 See generally IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (Oxford University 
Press 2d ed. 2005). 
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and control over local assets) and not by the expected utility of such 
approaches.23 Recognising that neither the pure version of universalist nor 
territorialist principle is ideal, nor in the interests of management of multi-
national insolvencies, the Model Law adopts a “modified universalist” 
principle.24 It allows for the opening of more than one set of insolvency 
proceedings, particularly in States where the debtor has a business presence, and 
strives for maximum cooperation and coordination among the various 
proceedings.  
To this end, Model Law, which is confined to procedural issues in cross-
border insolvency but is otherwise neutral as to the choice of law, provides for 
four main elements in relation to the conduct of cross-border insolvency cases: 
access, recognition, relief (assistance) and cooperation.25 The access provisions 
allow the foreign insolvency representative a right of access to the local court. 
The recognition provisions enable the court to recognize foreign proceedings 
either as a “foreign main proceeding” or a “foreign non-main proceeding.” The 
relief provisions allow relief to be available to assist in a foreign insolvency 
proceeding. The extent of the relief depends on whether the foreign proceedings 
are “foreign main proceeding,” which allows the automatic stay of actions 
against the debtor and its assets, or whether it is a “foreign non-main 
proceeding,” where more limited relief is available and is largely discretionary. 
The cooperation provisions permit cooperation and direct communication 
between the local court and the foreign court or foreign insolvency 
representatives. They also establish the coordination that is required for the 
management of concurrent proceedings, the aim of which is to “foster decisions 
that would best achieve the objectives of both proceedings.”26  
We argue that where States start from the position of having moderately 
territorialist approaches towards cross-border insolvency, they are more likely 
to adopt, wholesale, the moderately universalist approach found in the Model 
Law.27 However, where States start from the position of an exclusively 
territorialist approach, even in the presence of external pressure from 
 
 23 Mevorach, infra note 27, ch. 2. 
 24 See JAY L. WESTBROOK, National Regulation of Multinational Default, in ECONOMIC LAW AND 
JUSTICE IN TIMES OF GLOBALISATION: FESTSCHRIFT FOR CARL BAUDENBACHER (Mario Monti et al. eds., Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft 2007). 
 25 Guide, para. 24.  
 26 Guide, para. 42. 
 27 See generally on the Model Law and the evolving norm of ‘modified universalism’ in Irit Mevorach, 
Modified Universalism as Customary International Law, 96 TEX. L. REV.1403, 1405 (2018), though she 
concedes that the status of the principle is ‘somewhat amorphous’ and see also IRIT MEVORACH, THE FUTURE 
OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW: OVERCOMING BIASES AND CLOSING GAPS (Oxford ed., OUP, 2018). 
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international organisations on them to modernise their insolvency laws, they are 
more likely to adopt a version of the Model Law that signals their commitment 
to international norms (such as broadly agreeing to give effect to the recognition 
of foreign insolvency proceedings). At the same time, they impose more 
modifications, carve-outs or exceptions to give effect to path dependency. These 
deviations limit the accessible, quick and predictable outcomes of cases 
involving relief in the country concerning  cross-border insolvency. Thus, there 
are limits to convergence due to choices of the jurisdictions that are determined 
to signal their intentions to the international community.  
We contribute to the existing literature on the following academic debates in 
the following ways. First, drawing from political science and law, there exists a 
line of literature that explains factors in harmonization of international financial 
architecture, by emphasising the role of domestic regulatory preferences.28 For 
example, in the context of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Walter argues that 
the convergence to G-7 international financial standards in a number of Asian 
states is a function of domestic politics. However, there is substantial “mock 
compliance” where private-sector compliance costs are high and third party 
monitoring costs are low in the areas of corporate governance.29 Our research 
suggests the regulatory preferences involved in the signaling effect of adopting 
the Model Law remains significant in Asia-Pacific.  
Second, we seek to extend the scope of the comparative study of cross-
border insolvency and restructuring law to see how the initial choices of 
territorialist approaches can have lasting effects, demonstrating the limits of 
harmonization efforts.  
Further, our study is relevant to Asian and other jurisdictions, such as China, 
where debates are taking place as to whether to adopt the Model Law.30 Our 
study is particularly timely given the fact that UNCITRAL has felt the need to 
promulgate a supplemental Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Insolvency-Related Judgments.31 The lessons learned from the experience of the 
 
 28 See generally DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL鳥: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Cornell University Press, 2007); See also ANDREW WALTER GOVERNING 
FINANCE竺: EAST ASIA’S ADOPTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (Cornell University Press, 2008). 
 29 Id. at 3. 
 30 See e.g., Rebecca Parry and Nan Gao, The Future Direction of China’s Cross-Border Insolvency Laws, 
Related Issues and Potential Problems, 27 INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW 5 (2018). 
 31 See https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/mlij(last visited October 11, 2019). 
UNCITRAL has noted that according to the UK Supreme Court in Rubin [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236, 
long standing common law rules for the recognition of foreign insolvency judgments remained undisturbed by 
the UK’s adoption of the Model Law. The case had brought to light problems of a global nature and it was noted 
that the Model Law did not provide an explicit solution. This had led to significant uncertainty and might have 
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implementation of the Model Law will be relevant to the other supplemental 
Model Laws.  
The rest of the article is divided as follows. Section I explains the 
background and the judicial approaches towards cross-border insolvency that 
lead to the enactment of the Model Law. It then explains how the Model Laws 
have been enacted and interpreted in four jurisdictions in the Asia-Pacific, 
highlighting the key issues of divergence. Section II explains the reasons for the 
divergence in the implementation strategies. The article finally concludes with 
implications for UNCITRAL.  
I. DIVERGENCE OF ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE MODEL LAW 
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION 
A. Model Law and Existing Insolvency Framework in the Asia Pacific Region  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Model Law is “soft law” and States 
are free to implement the Model Law in the way that they think fit, including 
determining how the Model Law fits into the States’ domestic insolvency 
framework. Article 7 of the Model Law suggests that the Model Laws are only 
intended to provide threshold levels of assistance and that States are free to 
supplement them by providing additional assistance to a foreign insolvency 
representative.32 In its Guide, UNCITRAL explains that the purpose of the 
Model Law is not to displace provisions in national legislation to the extent that 
they provide assistance that is additional to, or different from, the type of 
assistance dealt with in the Model Law.33  
1. What happened in Australia and Singapore? 
Australia was one of the early adopters of the Model Law, which 
supplements common law and the existing aid and auxiliary provisions in the 
Corporations Act 2001.34 
 
a chilling effect on the prospects of the Model Law gaining international acceptance. Therefore, it was 
considered by UNCITRAL to be an opportune time to tackle the recognition and enforcement of these types of 
judgements - see UNCITRAL, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Recognition and enforcement of foreign 
insolvency-derived judgements, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.126 (Oct. 6, 2014); and UNCITRAL, Working 
Group V (Insolvency Law), Background information on topics comprising the current mandate of Working 
Group V and topics for future work, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.117 (Oct. 8, 2013).  
 32 Model Law, art. 7. 
 33 Guide, para. 105. 
 34 Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 580-581 (Austl.).  
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The legislation that implemented the Model Law, with suitable 
modifications to take into account local conditions, was the Cross Border 
Insolvency Act 2008.35 This Act was promoted on the basis that implementation 
by Australia of the Model Law would support development of a well-
understood, uniform, internationally recognized framework for administering 
cross-border insolvencies. While Australia already had some laws that dealt with 
cross-border insolvency cases, they were not be well suited to dealing with the 
manifold consequences and complexities of cross-border insolvencies.36 An 
international model law was “more likely to attract support and cooperation from 
other countries than the current mechanisms of the law which have been adopted 
unilaterally.”37 
The responsible body in Australia, the Treasury, as part of the Corporate 
Law Economic Review Program (CLERP) considered the possibility of having 
a single comprehensive Cross Border Insolvency Regime. Instead, it suggested 
enacting the Model Law as a standalone statute, albeit making appropriate 
adjustments to other insolvency law provisions. The Treasury acknowledged the 
advantages of having the whole law in the one place but adopted the view that 
these considerations were outweighed by other factors.38 For instance, the Model 
Law was styled and arranged somewhat differently than other Australian statutes 
and therefore did not dove-tail easily with existing Acts. The new law would be 
drafted as a coherent whole and therefore would be more useful to the courts. It 
was also suggested that a separate standalone statute would have greater 
international visibility.  
In the case of Singapore, the decision to adopt the Model Law was founded 
on the 2016 Report of the Committee on Singapore as an International Centre 
for Debt Restructuring39 and the 2013 Insolvency Law Review Committee 
 
 35 Australian cross-border insolvency law has been comprehensively covered by Professor Rosalind 
Mason in a series of scholarly articles including the following: Cross-border insolvency and legal 
transnationalisation, 21 INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW 105 (2012); Cross-Border Insolvency Bill 2007: 
The UNCITRCAL Model Law Enters the Parliamentary Stage Yet Australia Still Awaits the Final Act, 
15 INSOLVENCY L. J. 212 (2007); Local proceedings in a Multi-State Liquidation: Issues of Jurisdiction, 30 
MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY L. REV. 145 (2006). See also, Anil Hargovan, The Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 
(Cth) – Issues and Implications, 22 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 188 (2008). 
 36 See Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) Proposals for Reform Paper No 8: Cross-
Border Insolvency - Promoting International Cooperation and Coordination, Commonwealth of Australia 2002, 
at 14. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See generally, Gerard McCormack and Anil Hargovan, Australia and International Insolvency 
Paradigm, 37 SYDNEY L. REV. 389 (2015). 
 39 COMMITTEE TO STRENGTHEN SINGAPORE AS AN INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEBT RESTRUCTURING, 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (MINISTRY OF LAW) (2016), https://app.mlaw.gov.sg/files/news/public-
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Report.40 The 2016 Report referenced the provision of a clear and internationally 
recognized framework for resolving cross-border insolvencies41 while the 2013 
Report referred to a firmer and more predictable platform for cross-border 
cooperation in insolvency matters. The 2013 Report said that the “increased 
certainty and cooperation will in many cases lead to a greater predictability of 
process and outcome, which in many cases may possibly help lower the risks 
and costs of international financing, reduce the overall cost of insolvency 
litigation, and reduce the overall costs of obtaining recoveries or dividends from 
the cross-border insolvency process. It may also influence foreign investment in 
Singapore favourably.”42 The 2016 Report further referred to the fact that the 
Model Law was the international benchmark and there was (then) no multilateral 
convention on cross-border insolvency that could appropriately be adopted for 
this purpose.43 The enactment of the Model Law was a prominent and outward-
facing international milestone even though the Singapore courts have in recent 
years been particularly active in pushing forward the boundaries of judicial 
cooperation in cross border insolvencies and restructurings.44  
2. What happened in Korea and Japan? 
Prior to the enactment of their respective legislation based on the Model 
Law, Korea and Japan had each been regarded as taking a ‘territorialist’ 
approach towards cross-border insolvency. Since the relevant legislation came 
into force, there has been a move towards a more ‘modified universalist’ 
approach. However, as may be seen in the Section below, significant 
divergences still exist in the implementation and judicial interpretation.  
In Korea, prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the insolvency 
legislation which applied (the Corporate Reorganization Act, the Composition 
 
consultations/2016/04/Final%20DR%20Report.pdf (last visited October 11, 2019). 
 40 INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE: 
FINAL REPORT (MINISTRY OF LAW) (2013), 
https://app.mlaw.gov.sg/files/news/announcements/2013/10/ReportoftheInsolvencyLawReviewCommittee.pdf  
(last visited October 11, 2019). 
 41 Supra, n 39, para. 3.27. 
 42 p. 234 of the 2013 Report. 
 43 The Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments was not yet 
promulgated in 2016; it was promulgated in 2018. 
 44 E.g., Re Opti-Medix Ltd, [2016] SGHC 108 (Sing.), where the court acknowledged that in cross-border 
insolvency, there has been a general movement away from the traditional, territorial focus on the interests of the 
local creditors, towards recognition that universal cooperation between jurisdictions was a necessary part of the 
contemporary world. As a consequence of a greater sensitivity for universalist notions in insolvency, there was 
also a greater readiness to go beyond traditional bases for recognising foreign insolvency proceedings. See also 
another decision of the Singapore High Court in Re Gulf Pacific Shipping Ltd, [2016] SGHC 287 (Sing.). 
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Act and the Bankruptcy Act) was not significant and there were hardly any 
reorganisation proceedings.45 Financial institutions were reluctant to address 
insolvency or restructure non-performing loans, preferring to keep them in their 
books. However, when the Asian financial crisis struck in 1997, many 
companies, including financial institutions, were badly hit and applied for 
judicial proceedings to restructure.46 The crisis demonstrated that the non-
performing loans on the books of the financial institutions were highly toxic, 
almost leading to the institutions’ destruction. As a result, many international 
organisations, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
put pressure on Korea to implement whole-sale insolvency reforms.47 Partly 
pursuant to international pressure, the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy 
Bill was tabled before the National Assembly in 2003 and 2004, but passed in 
2005, with the effective date of March 1, 2006. The DRBA would become the 
single integrated legislation on insolvency and replaced former Corporate 
Reorganization Act, the Composition Act and the Civil Enforcement Act. 
The Corporate Reorganizations Act (which was repealed by the DRBA) was 
described by commentators48 and the Korean Supreme Court49 as distinctly 
territorial. For example, Article 4 of the Company Reorganization Act provided 
that reorganization proceedings commenced in a foreign country have no effect 
on property in Korea.50  
Oh has summarized the effect of the former Korean legislation: 
The corporate reorganization procedure and the bankruptcy procedure 
are effective on property in Korea ([Bankruptcy Act] Art. 3, 
[Corporate Reorganization Act)] Art. 6). Any foreign judgment on 
bankruptcy and any corporate reorganization procedure commenced 
by a foreign court cannot be applied to properties placed in Korea 
 
 45 See Soogeun Oh, An Overview of the New Korean Insolvency Law, 16-5 NORTON JOURNAL OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (2007) (Table 1 setting out the proceedings brought 1990 to 1997 which 
averages less than 80 a year). 
 46 Id. (Table 1 showing that the cases for reorganization and increased sharply in 1997 and 1998 to 132 
and 148). 
 47 TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, Korea: Legal Restructuring of the Market and State, 
in BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS, 211-246 (Stanford University Press, 
2009). 
 48 E.g., see HALLIDAY AND CARRUTHERS, supra note 47. 
 49 Korean Supreme Court Order of Mar. 25, 2010, 2009Ma1600 (Supreme Court of Korea), English 
translation available at 
https://www.scourt.go.kr/eng/supreme/decisions/NewDecisionsView.work?seq=559&pageIndex=1&mode=6
&searchWord= (visited Jan. 1, 2019). 
 50 Id. 
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([Bankruptcy Act] Art. 3, [Corporate Reorganization Act)] Art. 6.51 
With the onset of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, various international 
organisations including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
put pressure on Korea to implement whole-sale insolvency reforms, including 
the automatic stay upon application for commencement of insolvency 
proceedings.52 As part of the reform, Part V of DRBA included provisions that 
provide for the recognition and support of foreign insolvency cases in Korean 
courts and Korean insolvency proceedings in foreign courts, and appointment of 
an international administrator or trustee.53  
However, instead of closely following the language of the Model Law, the 
DRBA used its own wording and, in the process, made a number of 
modifications to the Model Law, which are detailed in the Section below. These 
key modifications include: (1) the lack of an automatic stay with the recognition 
of the foreign bankruptcy proceedings found in Article 20 of the Model Law, (2) 
modifying the provisions relating to judicial communication and cooperation in 
Article 25 of the Model Law; and (3) modifying the application of the hotchpot 
rule in Article 32 of the Model Law. However, developments in the last five 
years indicate that the issues relating to (2) and (3) may be more apparent than 
real.54  
In Japan, the enactment of the Law on Recognition of and Assistance for 
Foreign Insolvency Proceedings (Recognition Law) occurred in the wake of 
wide-ranging corporate and personal insolvency reforms following a prolonged 
recession in the 1990s.55 In 1996, a Bankruptcy Law Committee was set up in 
the Legislative Council to amend the laws relating to civil rehabilitation 
proceedings for small and medium size enterprises dealing with personal 
insolvency and create a new legal framework for cross-border insolvency. The 
Recognition Law, which was based on the Model Law, was tabled in 2000. The 
other important reform was the Corporate Reorganisation Law which was 
amended shortly thereafter in 2002 and took effect in 2003. Prior to the 
Recognition Law, Japanese insolvency laws were described as “distinctly 
territorial”.56 The administrator of the proceedings in Japan had no right to 
 
 51 Soogeun Oh, supra note 45. 
 52 HALLIDAY AND CARRUTHERS, supra note 47. 
 53 Id.  
 54 See discussion in Section I (B) below. 
 55 For Japan, see Stacey Steele, Insolvency Law in Japan, in INSOLVENCY LAW IN EAST ASIA 13 (Roman 
Tomasic ed., Ashgate Publishing 2006). See generally Yamamoto, supra note 18; Junichi Matsushita, 
Comprehensive Reform of Japanese Personal Insolvency Law, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 555 (2006). 
 56 Raj Bhala, International Dimensions of Japanese Insolvency Law, 19 MONETARY AND ECON. STUD. 
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manage and dispose of the debtor company’s assets located in a foreign country 
and vice versa. While Matsushita has pointed out that the Japanese courts have 
modified the strict territorial principle in cases where the purpose of the foreign 
administrator was to preserve the debtor company’s assets located in Japan, any 
such modifications are “modest”.57 Bhala has commented that even with the 
apparent relaxation of the strict territorialist principle, the Japanese courts only 
allow the foreign trustee to preserve the assets in Japan where there is no 
Japanese creditor seeking to attach the same assets.58  
The Recognition Law was described as being ahead of its time when enacted 
since there were few jurisdictions which had enacted the Model Law in 2000.59 
While Japan based its legislation on the Model Law, it did not follow the 
language of the Model Law strictly and made a number of modifications. With 
striking similarity to Korea, the main differences are the lack of an automatic 
stay and other consequences (including the lack of automatic turning over of 
assets to the insolvency representative) with the recognition of the foreign 
bankruptcy proceedings; modifying the provisions on judicial communication 
and cooperation; and the priority given to the local proceedings. The key areas 
of divergence are discussed below.  
B. Key Issues and Divergence in the Application of Model Law 
In this Section, we highlight the key issues arising under the Model Law and 
how States have diverged in the enactment and interpretation of the Model Law. 
We argue that due to the differences in the way that the Model Law has been 
adopted, States have signaled the recognition of giving effect to foreign 
insolvency proceedings. However, the details differ and these differences raise 
the broader question of whether the objectives of certainty and predictability 
have been achieved. The details differ in the following ways: (1) giving greater 
leeway for the domestic court to refuse recognition of the foreign proceedings; 
(2) not implementing specific provisions of the Model Law on the ground that 
the local law is unsettled or unclear or that there is no equivalent; and (3) limiting 
 
131, 166 (2001).  
 57 Junichi Matsushita, Present and Future Status of Japanese International Insolvency Law, 33 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 71, 75-77 (1998). 
 58 Bhala, supra note 56, at 163. 
 59 See references to notes 10 and 11 in Sohsuke Takahashi, The Reality of the Japanese Legal System for 
Cross-Border Insolvency: Driven by Fear of Universalism (Mar. 14, 2011) (unpublished comment) (on file with 
International Insolvency Institute). Only Japan, South Africa and Mexico adopted the Model Law in 2000. No 
other country had adopted the Model Law prior to 2000. See STATUS: UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/cross-border_insolvency/status 
(last visited Sep. 17, 2019).  
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the effects of recognition. 
1. Reciprocity and Public Policy Exception 
A central issue in the context of the Model Law is the possibility of a 
requirement of reciprocity – in other words, Country X should recognize foreign 
proceedings in Country Y only if Country Y recognizes proceedings from 
Country X. Reciprocity conditions are part of the insolvency laws in some 
countries. A glaring example is Article 5 of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law.60 But such conditions limit the effectiveness of the Model Law and 
adversely affect the capacity of a country to project itself as outward facing and 
progressive. A reciprocity requirement might be applied by a court on an ad hoc 
basis when considering the recognition of foreign proceedings – as the approach 
is in China. Alternatively, it might be carried out by a government agency that 
is given the task of designating certain countries as having fulfilled reciprocity 
conditions.61  
The majority of the countries that have adopted the Model Law have not 
insisted on the reciprocity requirement.62 When Singapore was considering the 
adoption of the Model Law, the arguments for and against imposing a reciprocity 
requirement were hotly debated. The Insolvency Law Review Committee noted 
that many of the advantages flowing from the Model Law, such as “equality of 
treatment for local creditors, the ease of recovering assets from foreign 
jurisdictions and more efficient treatment of international insolvencies involving 
local businesses may come only if other countries also enact the Model Law or 
an equivalent thereof.”63 The committee noted that the Model Law had not yet 
achieved widespread international adoption. Nevertheless, the committee 
decided not to recommend any reciprocity obligation64 and its reasons for 
adopting this viewpoint seem sound.  
While there is consensus among the majority of the countries that reciprocity 
 
 60 See generally Emily Lee, Problems of Judicial Recognition and Enforcement in Cross-Border 
Insolvency Matters Between Hong Kong and Mainland China, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 439 (2015). 
 61 South Africa took this approach when adopting the Model Law, but in fact, no countries have been so 
designated. Consequently, the Model Law is a dead letter as far as South Africa is concerned. See Cross-Border 
Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 § 2 (S. Afr.). See generally Alastair Smith & Andre Boraine, Crossing Borders into 
South African Insolvency Law: From the Roman-Dutch Jurists to the UNCITRAL Model Law, 10 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 135 (2002). 
 62 For a discussion of the countries that have versions of the reciprocity requirement, such as South Africa, 
Mexico and Romania, see generally Keith D. Yamauchi, Should Reciprocity be Part of the UNCITRAL Model 
Cross-border Insolvency Law, 16 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV.145 (2007). 
 63 2013 Report, supra note 5, at 236. 
 64 2013 Report, supra note 5, at 236-38. 
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is unnecessary, the Model Law contains certain elements that protect local 
creditors and local public policy. In relation to the latter, there is greater 
divergence in the implementation of the public policy rider and consequently, 
the courts’ interpretation thereof. Under the Model Law, a local court may refuse 
assistance in relation to foreign insolvency proceedings where assistance would 
be “manifestly contrary to the public policy” of the local State.65 The use of the 
word ‘manifestly’, however, suggests that “the public policy exception should 
be interpreted restrictively” and only invoked where a case involves matters 
“considered to be of fundamental importance”.66 There are suggestions in the 
English case - Cherkasov v Olegovich, the Official Receiver of Dalnyaya Step 
LLC67 – that the public policy exception may be used in cases where there is a 
breach of natural justice or procedural fairness. In this case, it was argued that 
Russian foreign insolvency proceedings were part of an asset-stripping exercise 
by instrumentalities of the Russian State to sideline political opponents. Rose J 
said:68 ‘It is true that Article 6 is to be read restrictively and will only be relevant 
in a very small number of cases. But this case falls clearly within that small 
class.’ The mere fact that the priorities of the foreign law in liquidating the 
company are different from English law is not sufficient to invoke English public 
policy.69 
Australia has adopted Article 6 of the Model Law and the provision was 
unsuccessfully invoked in Re Legend International Holdings70 to try to avoid 
recognition of a US Chapter 11 reorganisation. The court pointed out that courts 
are “slow” to invoke public policy.71 
Other States have implemented Article 6 slightly differently. In Singapore, 
Article 6 of the Model Law was adopted but without the word ‘manifestly.’ 
Japan’s72 and South Korea’s73 legislative provisions also did not include the 
 
 65 Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 6. 
 66 FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 462. 
 67 [2017] EWHC 756 (Ch), [2017] All ER (D) 11 (May). 
 68 UNCITRAL itself has recognized, the “notion of public policy is grounded on national law and may 
differ from State to State” – Guide, supra note 12, at para. 101. 
 69 Re Agrokor [2017] EWHC 2791 (Ch), para. 131. 
 70 [2016] VSC 308. 
 71 Id. at para 52. 
 72 Article 21(3) of the Japanese Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings 
(2001) allows a court to refuse recognition of a foreign proceeding considered to be contrary to the public order 
or good public morals in Japan. See SHIN ABE, Japan, in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, 324 (Look Chan Ho ed., Globe Law and Business 4th ed. 2017). There is no mention 
of ‘manifestly’ in the Japanese legislation adopting the Model Law. 
 73 See DRBA Article 632(2) (providing that the court may dismiss the petition for recognition if the 
foreign bankruptcy proceeding is contrary to the public policy of the Republic of Korea). See CHIYONG RIM, 
MCCORMACKWAN_10.1.19 6/9/2020 1:52 PM 
2019] IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIES 117 
 
word ‘manifestly.’ This would appear to allow the courts in these States more 
room to avoid giving effect to foreign insolvency proceedings. For example, Re 
Zetta Jets Pte Ltd, the Singapore High Court held that:  
This would seem to mean that recognition may be denied if recognition 
is merely contrary to public policy, without being manifestly so… 
What flows from the omission being deliberate is that the standard of 
exclusion on public policy grounds in Singapore is lower than that in 
jurisdictions where the Model Law has been enacted unmodified.74  
In that case, it was held that foreign insolvency proceedings instituted in breach 
of an injunction order granted in Singapore could not be recognized in Singapore 
on the ground that it was contrary to public policy.  
In addition to Article 6, there are other provisions in the Model Law that may 
be utilised to reflect the public policy choices such as protecting local creditors 
and enforcing or denying the enforcement of foreign revenue debts. In particular, 
Article 21(2) of the Model Law allows recognition of the foreign proceeding to 
be modified, including in cases where the debtor’s property is handed over to 
the foreign representative. The court needs to be satisfied that the local creditors 
are “adequately protected” and similarly, under Article 22(1), the court in 
granting, modifying or denying relief, must be satisfied that the interests of the 
creditors and other interested persons are “adequately protected”. However, 
“local creditors” and “adequate protection” are not defined in the Model Law 
and are left to the courts’ interpretation. In Australia, in Akers v Deputy 
Commissioner of Taxation,75 the Full Federal Court held that Articles 21 and 22 
operated to prevent the assets from being handed over for distribution in the 
foreign main proceeding unless the local creditor (in this case, the Australian tax 
authorities) was able to recover the amount equal to the pari passu claim of the 
taxation debt as an unsecured creditor in the foreign main proceeding. Under the 
relevant foreign law, the Australian foreign revenue debt could not be proved in 
the main proceedings. This order created a form of ‘mini-Australian liquidation’, 
which enables the tax authorities to recover such amounts as if the debtor had 
been wound up in Australia.76  
In Japan, in a departure from Article 21(2) of the Model Law, Article 31 of 
the Recognition Law provides that before the court allows the turning over of 
 
South Korea, in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, 585 (Look 
Chan Ho ed., Globe Law and Business 4th ed. 2017).  
 74 Re Zetta Jets Pte Ltd [2018] SGHC 16, at paras. 21, 23. 
 75 (2014) 223 FCR 8. 
 76 Gerard McCormack & Anil Hargovan, supra note 38, at 395-96.  
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the assets to a foreign country, the court must be satisfied that “there is no 
likelihood of the interests of creditors in Japan being unreasonably 
prejudiced”.77 This gives rise to two possible interpretations: the first, argued by 
Yamatomo, means that the provision is intended to protect the local creditors in 
the same way as the Model Law.78 An alternative interpretation raised by 
Anderson is that such an approach (which refers to unreasonable prejudice) 
attracts the risk that courts may take into account the relative positions of the 
local creditors in the foreign proceedings and not grant the order of turning over 
the assets to the foreign representative because the local creditors would have 
fared better in local proceedings.79 In this regard, it is noted that Article 35 of 
the Recognition Law requires the permission of the court before the debtor’s 
assets can be turned over to the foreign representative (which is not dissimilar 
to the Model Law80 where such consequences may occur upon recognition of 
foreign non-main proceedings).  
Article 6, as well as Article 21(2), are examples where the local adoption of 
these provisions gives rise to uncertainty and lack of predictability of outcomes 
to foreign representatives seeking recognition or assistance.  
2. Proceedings to Which the Model Law Applies 
The Model Law applies to “collective judicial or administrative proceeding 
… pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in which proceeding the assets and 
affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for 
the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.”81 The so-called “court” may not, 
strictly speaking, be a court as described since the Model Law refers to a judicial 
or other authority that can control or supervise proceedings.82 
The definition of collective insolvency proceedings covers both ‘debtor-in-
 
 77 Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings (Recognition Law) at art. 
31(2), translated in Matsushita and Steele, supra note 7. See also Kent Anderson, Testing the Model Soft Law 
Approach to International Harmonisation: A Case Study Examining the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
border Insolvency, 23 AUST. YBIL 1, 12 (2004); ABE, supra note 72, at 328. 
 78 Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 87. 
 79 See Anderson, supra note 77 at 12, citing Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in 
General Default: Chapter 15, the ALI Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 24-
26 (2002). See generally Lionel Meehan, Cross border insolvency law: Reform and recent developments in light 
of the JAL corporate reorganisation filing, 22 JBFLP 40 (2011) (arguing that this issue is largely untested in 
Japan). 
 80 Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 21(1)(e). 
 81 Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 2(a). Re Chow Cho Poon (Private) Ltd [2011] NSWSC 300, [2011] 
249 FLR 315, at para. 35. 
 82 Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 2(e). 
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possession’ restructuring regimes such as Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code of 1978 and manager displacing regimes like voluntary administration in 
Australia and judicial management in Singapore.83  
There are at least two issues with the general definition, and different 
implementing States have tweaked the basic Model Law definition in different 
ways in their adoption. There are issues surrounding ‘non-insolvency’ winding 
up. The laws in many countries contain provisions under which the affairs of a 
company may be wound up, its assets distributed, and its legal existence brought 
to an end even though the company may not be in any way insolvent. The 
winding up may be ordered on general public interest grounds, or on the basis 
that it is just and equitable to do so, e.g. in situations where the company is a 
small tightly-knit company and there are squabbles between the principals 
behind the company. 
It has been held in Australia that a winding-up order based on the just and 
equitable ground, can be regarded as a foreign proceeding within the Model Law 
because the power to wind up under this ground can be seen as part of a law 
relating to insolvency.84 Similarly, it has been held that an Australian members’ 
voluntary winding up, essentially a solvent liquidation, could be recognized 
under the US version of the Model Law, Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code, 
with appropriate assistance given.85 
These decisions might be justified on the basis that the foreign law under 
which the winding up is ordered is characterized as a law relating to winding up. 
Such characterization occurs even though the particular provisions under which 
winding up was ordered are not necessarily confined only to insolvency 
situations.86 
The second general point is that the different decisions may owe something 
to the different ways in which the Model Law has been adopted in different 
countries. For instance, schemes of arrangement have been adopted in Singapore 
and Australia, where they have been used extensively in recent years as debt 
 
 83 In 19 Entertainment Ltd [2016] EWHC 1545 (Ch), US Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganisation 
proceedings were recognized in the UK under the Model Law and CBIR as relevant foreign proceedings. It has 
also been held in Re New Paragon Investments Ltd [2012] BCC 371 that a creditors’ voluntary liquidation in 
Hong Kong was entitled to recognition in the UK under the Model Law and CBIR. The court held that “‘foreign 
proceeding’ included an extrajudicial or administrative proceeding provided it related to liquidation.” 
 84 Re Chow Cho Poon (Private) Ltd [2011] NSWSC 300; [2011] 249 FLR 315, at para. 51. 
 85 In re Betcorp Ltd (2009) 400 B.R. 266.  
 86 See Guide, supra note 12, at para. 48: “Where a proceeding serves several purposes, including the 
winding up of a solvent entity, it falls [within] the Model Law only if the debtor is insolvent or in severe financial 
distress”; see also 1997 Guide, supra note 12, at para. 71. 
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restructuring tools.87 The scheme of arrangement needs approval from a majority 
in number representing 75% in value of the class of members or creditors 
concerned voting at relevant class meetings. There are essentially three stages to 
the process with two separate court applications and the need to obtain court 
approval for the scheme. These separate steps, and the necessity of obtaining 
court sanction, are the reasons why at one point, the scheme procedure was 
thought to be costly and cumbersome and was little used. While the separate 
steps remain, judicial decisions have smoothed over some of the potential pitfalls 
such as disagreements over class composition and the need for multiple 
classes.88  
Schemes are not an insolvency procedure per se. Rather, they are a corporate 
law procedure. Therefore, they do not necessarily carry any insolvency ‘stigma’. 
In Japan, Article 2 of the Model Law, as implemented in the Japanese 
legislation, defines ‘foreign insolvency proceedings’ as proceedings outside 
Japan that correspond or are equivalent to, among others, a bankruptcy 
proceeding, a civil rehabilitation proceeding, and a corporate reorganisation 
proceeding; in other words, they are equivalent to those under the Japanese 
insolvency laws. A Japanese commentator has argued that what amounts to an 
equivalent proceeding under Japanese insolvency law would be the subject of 
judicial interpretation, as the Japanese legislation does not explain the specific 
characteristics of foreign insolvency law.89 In Korea, Article 628 of Debtor 
Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (DRBA), which incorporates Article 2 of the 
Model Law, specifically refers to, among others, rehabilitation proceedings, 
bankruptcy proceedings, and other similar proceedings for which petitions are 
filed with a foreign court (including the corresponding authorities).90 Schemes 
of arrangement are likely to be regarded as proceedings similar to rehabilitation 
proceedings. 
 
 87 Jason Harris, Class warfare in debt restructuring: Does Australia need cross-class cram down for 
creditors’ schemes of arrangement?, 36 U. OF QUEENSLAND L. J. 73 (2017). See generally CHRISTIAN 
PILKINGTON, SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT IN CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING (Sweet & Maxwell 2d ed. 2017); 
GEOFF O’DEA ET AL., SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT: LAW AND PRACTICE (Oxford University Press, 2012); 
JENNIFER PAYNE, SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014).  
 88 Sovereign Life Assurance Co v. Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573, 583 (a scheme class confined to those “persons 
whose rights are not so dissimilar to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common 
interest”). See generally Harris, supra note 87. 
 89 See also ABE, supra note 72, at 322-333. 
 90 See also RIM, supra note 73, at 582-583. 
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3. Treatment of Foreign Creditors 
Article 13 of the Model Law provides that foreign creditors have the same 
right as domestic creditors to institute and participate in insolvency proceedings. 
The common law does not discriminate on its face against foreign creditors. In 
Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation v Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors (of Navigator Holdings Plc),91 Lord Hoffmann observed that: “The … 
common law has traditionally taken the view that fairness between creditors 
requires that, ideally, bankruptcy proceedings should have universal application. 
There should be a single bankruptcy in which all creditors are entitled and 
required to prove.”92 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to make this point expressly since it provides 
clarity and transparency for foreign creditors and insolvency representatives. 
There is also a general provision in the Model Law that foreign creditors should 
not be ranked lower than the class of general non-preference domestic claims.93 
However, it may be that foreign creditors, such as foreign preferential 
creditors, find that their claims do not have the same status in the foreign forum 
as they do in their home country and many States exclude foreign revenue claims 
totally from recognition in insolvency proceedings. Indeed, UNCITRAL, in the 
Guide, acknowledges national sensitivities in this regard by giving States the 
leeway to continue the exclusion of foreign revenue claims.94 The US95, 
Australia96 and Singapore have made use of this ‘opt-out’. They have not used 
 
 91 [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 (appeal from The Isle of Man). 
 92 Id. at para. 16. 
 93 Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 13(2). 
 94 Guide, supra note 12, at para. 118-20.. See the discussion in FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 477. 
 95 US Bankruptcy Code, § 1513(b)(2)(B) (2012) provides that the admissibility and priority of a foreign 
tax claim is governed by any applicable tax treaty of the US, under the conditions and circumstances specified 
therein. The implementation of the Model Law in the US does not change US law on the (non)admissibility of 
foreign revenue claims. Some of the reasons for the exclusion were articulated by in British Columbia v. 
Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 1979). It was suggested that requiring countries to enforce foreign tax 
claims would require some analysis of the tax claim, and could be embarrassing to the foreign State. US courts 
may not be able to understand and evaluate foreign tax claims and enforcing such claims would ‘have the effect 
of furthering the governmental interests of a foreign country, something which our courts customarily refuse to 
do’. For a general discussion see generally Jonathan M. Weiss, Tax Claims in Transnational Insolvencies: A 
“Revenue Rule” Approach, 30 VA. TAX REV. 261 (2010). 
 96 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 s 12 (Austl.). From December 1, 2012, however the position is more 
nuanced following Australia’s ratification of the OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters. The Australian Commissioner of Taxation is obliged to assist in the recovery of tax claims from a 
large number of foreign jurisdictions that are party to this Convention and, subject to certain conditions, the 
Commissioner is empowered to recover the foreign tax claim as if it were its own – see also AUSTRALIAN 
TAXATION OFFICE, PRACTICE STATEMENT LAW ADMINISTRATION 2011/13 CROSS BORDER RECOVERY OF 
TAXATION DEBTS (2011).  
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the Model Law as an opportunity to amend general domestic law and make 
foreign tax claims enforceable.  
In Japan, while Article 13 of the Model Law is enacted in the Japanese 
legislation,97 the legislation does not specifically address the issue of foreign tax 
and social security claims.98 The position is similar to Korea where foreign 
creditors and domestic creditors are able to commence and participate in the 
local proceedings, but the implementing legislation is silent on foreign tax and 
social security claims.99 This gives rise to some uncertainty for foreign creditors 
seeking to commence or participate in the insolvency proceedings in Japan and 
Korea.  
Certainly, foreign creditors are often disadvantaged by the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. These proceedings may be taking place in a faraway 
country according to a procedure and in a language with which they are not 
familiar. Foreign creditors may not be aware of the time limits for lodging 
claims, or the proofs that must be submitted. It may require a translation of the 
claim into one of the official languages of the state where the proceedings have 
been opened, as well as the services of a foreign lawyer or other professional, 
and costs may render it uneconomical to submit a claim. “Due to high costs, 
creditors may choose to forgo a debt, especially when it involves a small amount 
of money. This problem mainly affects small and medium-sized businesses as 
well as private individuals.”100 
Article 14 of the Model Law contains certain concrete measures to alleviate 
the disadvantage that foreign-based creditors may suffer in practice. They must 
be notified individually of the proceedings, unless the court considers that some 
other form of notification would be more appropriate, or where the notification 
to local creditors is by advertisement of something equivalent. When notice of a 
right to lodge a claim is given to foreign creditors, the notification must indicate 
a reasonable time period for filing claims and set out a place for filing. These 
provisions are rather limited, however, and certainly they do not establish a 
comprehensive procedural framework.  
 
 97 Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings (Recognition Law) at art. 3, 
translated in Matsushita and Steele, supra note 7. See ABE, supra note 72, at 325. 
 98 See ABE, supra note 72, at 325. 
 99 See RIM, supra note 73, at 588. 
 100 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 
May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, at 16-17, COM (2012) 743 final (Dec. 12, 2012). 
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4. Extent of Application of Foreign Law 
A controversial issue in the context of Model Law is what sort of relief may 
be available to a foreign insolvency representative, and whether this includes the 
application of provisions of the relevant foreign law – an extra-territorial 
application of the foreign law in the recognizing State. The Model Law is 
somewhat ambiguous in Article 21(1)(g) on the granting of any additional relief 
that may be available under the laws of the recognizing State. This provision is 
more or less faithfully reproduced in some implementing States including 
Singapore, which refers to the grant of any additional relief that may be available 
to a Singapore insolvency office holder.101  
Transactional avoidance is dealt with in Article 23 of the Model Law which 
gives a foreign representative the standing to invoke local laws on transactional 
avoidance. Article 23 has been implemented in this way in Singapore102 and 
Australia.103  
The Australian and Singapore versions of the Model Law do not address 
specifically whether foreign law may be applied to decide the appropriate form 
of relief to grant to a foreign insolvency office holder. Nevertheless, it seems to 
limit the type of relief that may be granted to that available to an office holder 
in local proceedings, and this approach appears to exclude the application of 
foreign law.  
Korea and Japan have not implemented Article 23 of the Model Law 
explicitly, because the law on transaction avoidance is complicated and remains 
unsettled in the two countries.104 Insofar as Article 21(1)(g) of the Model Law 
is concerned as to the reliefs, in Korea, Article 636 of DRBA, (which is based 
on Article 21 of the Model Law), the court has taken the view that recognition 
of a foreign discharge must be based on the local laws of civil procedure.105 The 
foreign discharge cannot be recognized by obtaining recognition and relief under 
DRBA.106 In Japan, Article 26(1) of the Recognition Law allows for the court to 
 
 101 Companies Act 2006, supra note 5, at art. 21(1)(g), Sch. 10 (Sing.). 
 102 Companies Act 2006, supra note 5, at art. 23, Sch. 10 (Sing.). 
 103 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 s 17 (Austl.). 
 104 See RIM, supra note 73; Yamamoto, supra note 18, at 88; and ABE, supra note 72 at 328. 
 105 MIN HAN, Recognition of Insolvency Effects of a Foreign Insolvency Proceeding: Focusing on the 
Effect of Discharge, in TRADE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH HARMONIZATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 353 (Muruga 
Perumal Ramaswamy & Joao Ribeiro eds., New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, 2015) (citing 
Supreme Court decision dated March 20, 2010 (case no: 2009MA1600)). 
 106 While the judicial position in Japan is not clear, the prevailing scholarly view is that recognition of a 
foreign discharge should be effected by recognition of a foreign judgment under the domestic law of Japan and 
not by the legislation based on the Model Law. See Id.  
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grant a “disposition” with regard to the debtor’s assets and business to give effect 
to the recognition and assistance proceedings, but it is assumed that disposition 
is limited to what is permitted under the civil code or civil procedure code. 
In more recent developments, UNCITRAL has attributed its decision to 
adopt a new Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-
related judgments to the chilling effect of Rubin and the 2010 Korean decision, 
Gohap.107 In Gohap, the Supreme Court of Korea held that the US Bankruptcy 
Court order approving a rehabilitation plan, which purported to discharge a 
Korean law-governed debt, could not be recognized under the DRBA provisions 
relating to recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings.108 However, the 
discharge resulting from the US Bankruptcy Court order could be recognized as 
an ordinary foreign judgment if the standard conditions under Korean law for 
recognition of such judgments were satisfied.109 
It remains to be seen however whether States will take the approach of 
adopting a new corpus of rules on insolvency-related judgments or merely 
clarifying that their existing Model Law implementation provisions allow the 
recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments and indeed the 
application of foreign law. The new Model Law states that it is not intended to 
replace legislation in States that have enacted the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Model Law or to limit the application of that legislation.110 
5. Effects of Recognition and Automatic Stay 
Article 20 of the Model Law provides for automatic effects upon recognition 
of a foreign main proceeding, such as an automatic stay. While the common law 
countries of Australia111 and Singapore112 have implemented Article 20, Japan 
and Korea have not done so. In Japan, there is no distinction between foreign 
main proceedings and foreign non-main proceedings. The Japanese version of 
 
 107 See UNCITRAL, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Recognition and enforcement of foreign 
insolvency-related judgements: draft guide to enactment of the model law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.151, 
at para. 2, note 1 (Sept. 20, 2017). 
 108 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Ma1600, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.)., English translation available at 
https://www.scourt.go.kr/eng/supreme/decisions/NewDecisionsView.work?seq=559&pageIndex=1&mode=6
&searchWord=. 
 109 See Kwang Yun Suk, South Korea, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Asia (Asian 
Business Law Institute, 2017), available at https://abli.asia/Projects/Foreign-Judgments-Project  
 110 See, UNICITRAL, Judgments Model Law, 3-4 
(https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/interim_mlij.pdf). Recital 2 of 
the preamble and Article X. 
 111 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008, § 16 (Austl.) 
 112 Companies Act, 2006, art. 20, Sch. 10 (Sing.). 
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the Model Law provides that the court has the discretion to grant relief upon or 
after issuing a recognition order.113 Yamatomo has explained the decision not to 
allow an automatic effect on the ground that to do so would result in the 
recognising court being so prudent in deciding on recognition that it would delay 
the process of recognition.114 However, he argues that Japanese law “permits the 
court to recognize a foreign non-main proceeding along the line of the [M]odel 
[L]aw scheme, and, [furthermore], to stay a local proceeding based on 
recognition of a foreign main proceeding under several conditions”.115  
Similar to Japan, Korea has not adopted the automatic stay upon recognition 
of the foreign bankruptcy proceedings.116 For relief to be obtained in connection 
with the foreign bankruptcy proceeding, the foreign representative has to file a 
petition for relief under Article 635 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy 
Act (provisional relief prior to recognition of the foreign bankruptcy proceeding) 
and/or Article 636 (relief granted upon such recognition). This reflects the 
Korean position that an automatic stay does not follow a bankruptcy petition.117 
The reliefs prior to recognition that can be applied for by the foreign insolvency 
representative include the suspension of a lawsuit relating to the debtor’s 
business or property, prohibition of suspension of compulsory execution, and 
prohibition of repayment or disposition of the debtor’s property by the debtor.118  
Oh has argued that Korea departs from the automatic stay provisions in the 
Model Law because the country aimed to ensure specialisation of its courts in 
handling cross-border insolvencies. Thus, the foreign insolvency representative 
has to first apply to the Seoul Central District Court for recognition, which has 
expertise on cross-border insolvency cases, before it can apply to any other 
district court that has jurisdiction.119 In contrast, under Article 11 of the Model 
Law, the foreign insolvency representative can apply for domestic insolvency 
proceeding before the recognition of the foreign proceeding. Rim has reported 
that as of the end of November 2016, Korean courts only recognized six foreign 
 
 113 Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings, art. 25. ABE, supra note 72, 
at 328. 
 114 YAMAMOTO supra note 18, at 83. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Article 633 of the DRBA provides that an order for recognition of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding 
shall not affect the commencement or the continuation of local proceedings. See RIM, supra note 73, at 586-587. 
 117 See RIM, supra note 73, at 587. See also Soogeun Oh, An Overview of the New Korean Insolvency Law, 
16 NORTON JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 751, 779 (2007). 
 118 See Korean Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act, 2006, (Ref. No. 26166) Art. 635. Soogeun Oh, 
An Overview of the New Korean Insolvency Law, supra, id, 779. 
 119 See Id.  
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bankruptcy proceedings.120 
A related point is the coordination of concurrent proceedings. Article 28 of 
the Model Law allows the commencement of concurrent local proceedings even 
after the recognition of the foreign main proceedings. Article 29 provides for the 
coordination of the orders made between the two sets of proceedings. The Model 
Law also allows for the recognition and the local proceedings to proceed in 
parallel. However, the Japanese Recognition Law departs from Articles 28 and 
29 because while it does not prohibit the commencement of proceedings, only 
one proceeding is allowed to commence at a time, and priority is given to the 
local proceeding with a stay on the recognition proceeding, unless certain 
exceptions apply.121 In Korea, there are also differences between the Model Law 
and domestic legislation on how concurrent proceedings are managed; the 
recognition of the foreign proceeding is a pre-requisite to the foreign insolvency 
representative commencing domestic proceedings in Korea,122 and it is not 
possible to commence the domestic proceedings until recognition is obtained. 
The explanation is to ensure that the Seoul District Court has the expertise and 
should hear the recognition case first.123 
6. Judicial Communication and Cooperation 
While Singapore and Australia have adopted Article 25 of the Model Law,124 
this is an area where the civil law countries have diverged “in the books”.125 
Japan has not adopted Article 25, which provides for court to court 
communication and cooperation. Yamatomo has argued that express enactment 
 
 120 RIM, supra note 73, at 584. 
 121 Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings 129 of 2000, Arts. 57-60, 
(Japan). The conditions are where the foreign proceeding is a “foreign main proceeding”, recognition of the 
foreign proceeding will be of benefit to the general interests of creditors (including creditors outside Japan) and 
the interests of local creditors will not be unjustly harmed by the recognition of the foreign proceeding.  
 122 See Korean Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act, 2006, (Ref. No. 26166) Art. 634. 
 123 See Soogeun Oh, An Overview of the New Korean Insolvency Law, 16 Norton Journal of Bankruptcy 
Law and Practice 5 art. 5, 19 (2007). 
 124 The development of international judicial cooperation between courts may also take place in the form 
of bilateral arrangements. For example, in September 2018, Singapore has signed two Memoranda of 
Understanding with the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and for the South District of New 
York to effect judicial cooperation between Singapore and with each of these courts. See SUPREME COURT, 
GREATER EXCELLENCE IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, available at 
https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/news/media-releases/towards-greater-excellence-in-cross-border-insolvency 
(last visited October 11, 2019). For the position in Australia, see JACKSON, SHERYL; MASON, ROSALIND, 
DEVELOPMENTS IN COURT TO COURT COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES, 37 37(2) 
UNSW LAW JOURNAL 507, 512-519 (2014). 
 125 See Companies Act, 2006, ch.50, Sch. 10, art 25 (Sing.); see also Cross-Border Insolvency Act, 2008, 
§ 6 (Austl.) 
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of this provision is not necessary. It has been pointed out that there is already 
inherent power of the courts to cooperate.126 Certainly in Japan, in practice, there 
appears to be evidence of assistance and cooperation with foreign courts. A 
study by Anderson Mori and Tomotsune provides that, as of April 2017, the 
Tokyo District Court had provided relief in 15 cases either through 
administration orders (appointment of a trustee to administer the Japanese assets 
of a foreign company) or stay orders (prohibiting enforcement by creditors 
against Japanese assets so as to facilitate foreign restructurings).127 In the same 
study, the authors have argued that while Japan does not have the equivalent of 
Article 25, the Tokyo District Court “has generally provided assistance to 
foreign trustees and debtors-in-possession (DIPs) immediately after the 
recognition of the relevant foreign proceeding. This is because debtors are 
generally able to hold prior consultation with the Tokyo District Court, which 
enables the court carefully to review cases in advance.”128  
In Korea, Article 641 of the DRBA adopts Model Law Article 25 but limits 
the cooperation of the court with a foreign court or a representative of a foreign 
insolvency proceeding. Other persons, such as an examiner, do not have power 
to communicate with the foreign court or a foreign representative.129 Rim has 
argued that the South Korean courts are more likely to communicate and 
exchange information via the foreign representative than through direct 
communication because of the differences in legal systems and language 
issues.130 However, such an impediment may not actually be borne out in 
practice. In recent years, it has been reported that the Korean judges cooperated 
with New Jersey judges by participating in a conference call during a recent 
cross-border insolvency case involving a Korean shipping company.131  
 
 126 See generally SHIN ABE, Japan, in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, 324 (Look Chan Ho ed., Globe Law and Business 2nd ed. 2009). 
 127 See YURI IDE & ATSUSHI NISHITANI, LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY IN JAPAN, 
3-4 (Anderson Mori & Tomotsune, May 2017), available at https://www.amt-
law.com/asset/en/pdf/bulletins11_pdf/170531.pdf (last visited October 11, 2019). Similarly, Shin Abe reports 
that there are 15 cases as at 2017; see ABE, supra note 72, at 330. Cf. Irit Mevorach, On the Road to Universalism: 
A Comparative and Empirical Study of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 12(4) EBOR 
517, 546-549 (2011), which only records three cases from Japan granting relief as at 2010. 
 128 SEE IDE & NISHITANI, LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY IN JAPAN, 3-4 (ANDERSON 
MORI & TOMOTSUNE, MAY 2017), HTTPS://WWW.AMT-LAW.COM/ASSET/EN/PDF/BULLETINS11_PDF/170531.PDF 
(LAST VISITED JAN. 1, 2019). 
 129 RIM, supra note 73, at 595. 
 130 Id.  
 131 Allen & Overy has reported the cooperation between the Korean court and the New Jersey court in 
dealing with a cross-border insolvency in 2017. See ALLEN & OVERY, RESTRUCTURING ACROSS 
BORDERS, 9 (December 2017), http://www.allenovery.com/expertise/practices/restructuring/Pages/Korea-
corporate-restructuring.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2019).  
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Moreover, Korea has entered into a Memoranda of Understanding regarding 
judicial cooperation. In April and May 2018 respectively, the Seoul Bankruptcy 
Court has separately executed a Memorandum with the US Bankruptcy Court 
for the Southern District of New York132 and Singapore insolvency cases133  
7. The Hotchpot Rule or Rule of Payment in Concurrent Proceedings 
Article 32 of the Model Law ensures that outside of secured claims and rights 
in rem, a creditor who has received partial payment in respect to a foreign 
proceeding may not receive a payment on the same claim in the local proceeding 
regarding the same debtor, without bringing into the hotchpot his foreign 
payment. The rationale of the rule has variously been described as founded on 
the pari passu principle,134 or to prevent the distortion of the policy of 
distribution that applies to insolvency.135 The rule prevents creditors from 
gaining more favourable treatment, as compared with other creditors in the same 
class, in insolvency proceedings in different jurisdictions. Singapore136 and 
Australia137 have adopted Article 32 of the Model Law. In particular, for 
Australia, the rule is not controversial as it has been long established in the 
common law.138 The exclusion of secured claims and rights in rem is also 
consistent with the common law because secured creditors claim primarily from 
their rights in rem, and it is the value from their rights in rem that satisfy their 
claims. If their claims are not satisfied from their rights in rem, they look to 
repayment of the balance as unsecured creditors.  
In Korea and Japan, legislation is based on Article 32 of the Model Law but 
there are significant departures. In Japan, secured creditors are subject to the 
hotchpot rule under the Corporate Reorganization Law,139 and a creditor in a 
local proceeding may receive the dividend after deducting the amounts collected 
from the foreign proceedings.140 There are two further differences between the 
 
 132 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Soeul Bankruptcy Court and the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for SDNY, 1-2 (http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/MOU_SDNYBK_SBC.pdf) 
(last visited October 11, 2019) 
 133 SUPREME COURT, GREATER EXCELLENCE IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 4-6, supra, n 124. 
 134 See Banco de Portugal v. Waddell (1880) 5 App Cas 161 ; Cleaver v. Delta American Reinsurance 
[2001] UKPC 6. 
 135 LOOK CHAN HO, Insolvency Policy and the Pari Passu Principle, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, 288-290 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2016).  
 136 See Companies Act, 2006, art. 32, Sch. 10 (Sing.). 
 137 See Cross-Border Insolvency Act, 2008, § 6 (Austl.) 
 138 For Australia, see Re Harris, Goodwin & Co (1887) 5 QLJ (NC) 94; for UK, see Cleaver v. Delta 
American Reinsurance Co [2001] UKPC 6, [2001] 2 AC 328.  
 139 Corporate Reorganization Act, Law no. 154 of 2002, art. 137 (Japan). 
 140 ABE, supra note 72, at 329. 
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Japanese legislation and the Model Law as identified by Japanese scholars. First, 
payments outside foreign insolvency proceedings are subject to the rule, 
including payments in execution proceedings or voluntary payments by debtors. 
This differs from the Model Law, which only affects payments in foreign 
insolvency proceedings. The rationale was described as aiming for ‘high-grade 
cooperation and more equal treatment of creditors’.141 Second, the Japanese 
legislation is confined only to payments after the commencement of local 
proceedings, though it has been argued that this may not be significant in 
practice.142 However, the outcomes may not differ significantly from the 
common law position in Australia or Singapore. In relation to the former, at 
common law, the hotchpot rule does not capture payments that are made outside 
the foreign proceedings, 143 though it is possible that under the domestic 
insolvency laws, such payments may be set aside on the ground of unfair 
preference. In relation to the latter, at common law, payments made before the 
commencement of local proceedings do not fall within the hotchpot rule.144 
Korea enacted Article 642 of the DRBA, which differs from Article 32 of 
the Model Law in two material respects. First, Article 642 of the DRBA captures 
payments not only in respect of foreign proceedings but also judgment execution 
proceedings and foreclosure proceedings.145 Second, Article 642 is silent on the 
exclusion of secured claims, which indicate that secured claims fall within 
Article 642. The rationale for this view is that secured debts are subject to the 
rehabilitation proceedings in Korea.146 Min Han has taken a different view and 
argued that payment recovered from collateral outside of Korea should not be 
affected by Article 642.147Article 642 has been described as giving rise to 
 
 141 YAMAMOTO supra note 18, at 95. 
 142 Id.  
 143 The hotchpot rules applies in respect of a creditor who has received full or partial satisfaction of debt 
through an attachment that is subsequent to the opening of a UK insolvency process rather than by means of an 
existing security interest. See Re Somes, Ex P De Lemos (1896) 3 mans 131. (available on Heinonline.com in 
“Reports of Cases in Bankruptcy and Companies’ Winding-up”). On the other hand, a creditor who has 
completed an attachment before the opening of English insolvency proceedings is in a position akin to that of a 
secured creditor and may keep what she has received . See Cleaver v. Dealta American Reinsurance [2001] 
UKPC 6, [2001] 2 AC 328; and see generally the discussion in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 511-514 (Richard 
Sheldon ed., Bloomsbury Professional 4th ed. 2015). 
 144 See Cleaver v. Delta American Reinsurance [2001] UKPC 6; [2001] 2 AC 328 (citing Banco de 
Portugal v. Wardell (1880) 5 App Cas 161 and noting that, on the facts of that case: “had the Portuguese creditors 
received their dividend before the commencement of the English liquidation, they would not have been required 
to bring it into the hotchpot as a condition of proving in England” (para 25). 
 145 See RIM, supra note 73, at 595-596. 
 146 See RIM, supra note 73, at 595. 
 147 Id. Min Han, The Hotchpot Rule in Korean Insolvency Proceedings, 7 J KOREAN L 445, 445-468 
(2008). 
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complex problems.148 For payments that are made without concurrent foreign 
proceedings, some other mechanism within Korean law will need to be invoked 
to achieve equality of payments among the creditors within the same class.  
II. REASONS FOR THE DIVERGENCE IN IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES 
A. Legal Origins  
Scholars have long argued that convergence towards a set of international 
norms may be based on historical and other legacies. Pistor argues that the 
colonial legacies may produce convergence in the resolution of problems that 
are based around legal families such as common law or civil law.149 Halliday 
and Carruthers argue that such convergence may then be reinforced by the US 
dominance of both the legal regulation and the rule of law discourse and 
narrative.150 Scholars have pointed out that the Model Law is based on an 
American ideal of modified universalism.151 The English common law reflected 
the principle of universality (at least insofar as regarding its own insolvency 
proceedings),152 and it could be expected that the countries which follow the 
Anglo-American model (such as Singapore and Australia) will be more ready to 
adopt solutions provided by the Model Law.  
The argument based on legal origins has some support in the literature. As 
mentioned in the Introduction above, Yamatomo argues that civil law countries 
find it difficult to adopt whole-sale provisions of the Model Law. He argues that 
evidence can be seen in the provisions on communication and cooperation, 
where civil law judges will have difficulty dealing with the discretion given to 
judges.153 However, Anderson has argued that such an explanation is not 
 
 148 See RIM, supra note 73, at 595-596. 
 149 Katharina Pistor, The Standardisation of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50(1) AM. J. 
COMP. L. 97 (2001). 
 150 TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND SYSTEMIC 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 10 (Stanford University Press, 2009). 
 151 The earlier law contained in US Bankruptcy Code s 304 as originally enacted (allowing for foreign 
insolvency representative to file ancillary proceedings to seek assistance in the US). See 11 U.S.C § 304 (1978). 
The provision has since been repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act. See 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, sec. 102(g)(3), 
§ 1325(a), 119 Stat. 23, 33 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(7)).  
 152 See Cambridge Gas Transport v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings, 
supra note 91, at paras. 16-17. Endorsements of universalism. See also Re HIH casualty and General Insurance; 
McMahon v. McGrath [2008] 1 WLR 852, 856-857. 
 153 YAMAMOTO supra note 18, at 69. See also James Spigelman, Cross-Border Insolvency: Co-operation 
or Conflict?, 83(1) ALJ 44, 64 (2009) (pointing out that common law judges can rely on the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court in the way that civil law judges may not be able to do so). See generally Raj Bhala, International 
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convincing, considering the fact that other civil law countries have adopted these 
Model Law provisions without such qualification.154 Further, more recent 
developments have shown that the civil law courts are taking more proactive 
steps in entering into judicial cooperation.155 
At first sight, the theory based on legal origins appears to be attractive, but 
it does not provide a complete account of the divergence. There are a number of 
examples to demonstrate this point. For instance, common law countries, as 
highlighted in Section I, the public policy rider in Singapore is enacted 
differently from Australia and is now subject to different interpretations. In 
Singapore, the High Court has taken the view that the standard to invoke the 
public policy ground is lower.156 The choices made by Korea and Japan in the 
examples discussed in Section I are not founded in civil law traditions. Three 
examples are highlighted. First, Korea and Japan did not adopt an automatic stay 
consequent upon the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings. The reason 
is not the inability of civil law to produce the consequences of an automatic stay, 
but rather for reasons linked closely to the path dependence. The then existing 
Korean and Japanese law prior to the Model Law did not provide for such stays 
and neither did the reforms to their laws as a consequence of the Asian financial 
crisis (in the case of Japan) or the prolonged downturn of the economy (in the 
case of Japan).157  
Second, Korea and Japan also give priority to local proceedings where there 
are concurrent foreign and recognition proceedings. Korea limits the ability of 
the insolvency representative to file the local proceedings before recognition; 
Japan stays the recognition of foreign proceedings to give priority to local 
proceedings unless certain exceptions apply.158 Japan also requires separate 
court approval for the assets to be turned over to the insolvency representative.159 
There is no suggestion in the academic literature that Korea and Japan’s failure 
to follow the framework of the Model Law was due to inherent difficulty based 
on the civil law traditions or any precedent.  
Third, where Korean and Japanese law is silent, as it is on tax and social 
security claims and transaction avoidance claims, the legislation under the 
 
Dimensions of Japanese Insolvency Law, MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 131 (2001). 
 154 ANDERSON, supra note 77, at 13-14. 
 155 Supra Section I(B)(6). 
 156 See Re Zetta Jets Pte Ltd, supra note 74.  
 157 See Id.  
 158 See discussion in note 121 and accompanying next.  
 159 See note 80 and accompanying text. 
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respective jurisdiction chooses not to explicitly adopt the Model Law position.160 
This suggests that where Korea and Japan do not have an explicit solution in 
their domestic law, they prefer a wait and see approach, rather than to adopt the 
uniformity and harmonization of the Model Law.  
B. Signalling Effect  
We present an alternative theory. We argue that where States are considering 
shifting from a moderately territorialist approach towards cross-border 
insolvency to the modified universalism approach as envisaged by the Model 
Law, they are more likely to implement the Model Law in full. However, where 
States start from exclusively territorialist approaches towards embracing cross-
border insolvency, they are likely to be more circumspect and require more 
exceptions or carve-outs from the Model Law to allow for room to avoid having 
to give full effect to the recognition of the foreign insolvency proceedings.  
We draw a parallel example to deviations from international standards that 
are driven by multilateral organizations, despite states’ ostensible adoption of 
these standards. Post-Asian financial crisis of 1997, based on the studies in 
Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, and Malaysia, Andrew Walter has pointed 
out that there is substantial “mock” compliance with G7-led project on 
international financial regulation (relating to banking and securities regulation, 
corporate governance, disclosures and policy transparency). Such cosmetic or 
mock compliance arises from, among others, path dependence and the enduring 
concentration of family owned companies. These make compliance very costly 
for the private actors.161  
In this regard, we turn to our case studies. Singapore and Australia, prior to 
the adoption of the Model Law, were moving towards a modified universalist 
approach towards cross-border insolvency. In Singapore, prior to the adoption 
of the Model Law in May 2017, there was no comprehensive legislation on 
dealing with cross-border insolvency. The Companies Act then provided for a 
‘ring fencing’ rule. If a company registered in Singapore as a foreign company 
was the subject of a Singapore secondary liquidation, then assets collected in the 
course of the Singapore proceedings should be set aside for the payment of debts 
incurred in Singapore, before being remitted to the foreign liquidator in the 
foreign insolvency proceedings.162 However, apart from the legislative 
 
 160 Section I (B)(4). 
 161 See generally WALTER, supra, n 28. 
 162 Companies Act 2006, § 377(3)(c) (Sing.) (prior to the amendment in 2017); see Beluga Chatering 
GmbH (in liquidation) v. Beluga Projects (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 815. 
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provisions which constrain the remission of assets of an insolvent foreign 
company, more recent case law has demonstrated the courts’ willingness to 
provide other forms of assistance at common law in respect of foreign 
insolvency proceedings. In the unreported judgment of Aero Inventory (UK) Ltd, 
Re163 cited in Beluga, the Singapore High Court recognized an administration 
order made by the English High Court and held that the administrators of an 
English company would have the same power over the company’s property and 
assets in Singapore as they had under English law. A similar order was made 
recently in respect of the recognition of the administration order made against 
All Leisure Holidays.164 Further examples are given by (then) Chief Justice Chan 
Sek Keong on the Singapore courts giving effect to modified universalism, in 
the form of recognition of foreign proceedings.165 In Re Opti-Medix, the High 
Court expressed the view that: 
In cross-border insolvency, there has been a general movement away 
from the traditional, territorial focus on the interests of the local 
creditors, towards recognition that universal cooperation between 
jurisdictions is a necessary part of the contemporary world. Under a 
[u]niversalist approach, one court takes the lead while other courts 
assist in administering the liquidation. This is the most conductive to 
the orderly conduct of business and resolution of business failures 
across jurisdictions.166 
In Australia, prior to the enactment of the Model Law, and apart from the 
common law, Australia had (and still has) the following provisions that are 
relevant to cross-border insolvency: Corporations Act 2001, sections 580-581 
(the aid and auxiliary provisions), section 583 (the winding up of foreign 
companies provisions) and section 601CL (the ancillary liquidation 
provision).167 These aid and auxiliary, and ancillary liquidation provisions, 
reflect a modified universalist approach towards cross-border insolvency, 
though the Model Law made further moves in that direction.168 For example, in 
the aid and auxiliary provisions, a distinction is drawn between prescribed and 
 
 163 See Beluga Chatering GmbH (in liquidation) v. Beluga Projects (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 815, 
para. 88. 
 164 ANDREW CHAN ET AL., Singapore, in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 500 (Look Chan Ho ed., Globe Law and Business, 4th ed. 2017). Cf. Singapore 
Insolvency Law Review Committee arguing that there is some reported authority to show that recognition at 
common law is limited (2013 Report, p. 230).  
 165 See generally Sek Keong Chan, Cross-Border Insolvency Issues Affecting Singapore, 23 SACLJ 413 
(2011).  
 166 [2016] 4 SLR 312, para. 17. 
 167 McCormack and Hargovan, supra note 38. 
 168 See Rosalind Mason, Implications of the UNCITRAL Model Law for Australian Cross-Border 
Insolvencies, 8(2) INT. INSOLV. REV 83, 107 (1999). 
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non-prescribed countries, with the former requiring that aid of auxiliary 
provisions to the foreign courts is mandatory, and in the latter, such aid is 
discretionary. Insofar as the ancillary liquidation provisions are concerned, 
section 601CL(14) contemplates a universalist approach towards cross-border 
insolvency in that the Australian court appoints an Australian liquidator of the 
foreign company on the application of the foreign liquidator. Section 601(15) 
requires the Australian liquidator to recover and realize the property of the 
foreign company in Australia, and to pay the net amount so recovered and 
realized to the foreign liquidator. Section 601(15) does not provide for ring 
fencing of the local assets, in the way that section 377(c) of the Singapore 
Companies Act previously required, and there is some ambiguity as to whether 
the court will order a full remission of the assets abroad pursuant to section 
601(15) if the foreign scheme of distribution differs from the Australian 
scheme.169  
Thus, in Singapore and Australia, albeit in different degrees, the courts have 
been receptive to more universalist principles in the management of international 
insolvencies, and are likely to be influenced by the criticisms of the territoriality 
principles.  
However, Korea and Japan have started from the position of being 
exclusively territorialist in nature.170 Both jurisdictions adopt the legislation 
based on the Model Law partly in response to domestic and international 
criticism on their treatment of cross-border insolvency post-crises. While both 
jurisdictions have adopted legislation based on the Model Law and allow for the 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, pre-existing outcomes under 
existing legislation remains preserved in a number of ways. We argue that the 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings sends an important signal of 
adhering to global norms of modified universalism in the wake of the crises and 
yet simultaneously allows both jurisdictions to avoid having to commit to 
allowing full effects of recognition otherwise found in the Model Law. However, 
once we go deeper on the detailed impact of the adoption of the Model Law in 
different jurisdictions, we are see significant divergences.  
The reasons are as follows. Korea’s wide ranging bankruptcy reforms were 
brought closer to international standards, including having in place 
reorganisation proceedings, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, 
due to pressure from the IMF and World Bank. However, as Korea adopted 
 
 169 See McCormack and Hargovan, supra note 38, at 401. 
 170 See supra Section I(A) above. 
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many of the bankruptcy reforms, it did not adopt several other reforms, such as 
an automatic stay on debt collection upon application for bankruptcy. This 
choice was heavily resisted. Thus, it was not surprising that Korea resisted 
having the automatic stay from the Model Law and has limited a number of 
consequences that will otherwise follow from the recognition. Thus, in Korea, 
the reforms on substantive bankruptcy law deal more with signalling as opposed 
to full functional reform; the same can be said for the Model Law.171 However, 
judicial attitudes sometimes change, as evidenced in Korea’s recent 
Memorandum of Understanding with foreign courts.  
Likewise, in Japan, the Recognition Law gives effect to the recognition of 
foreign insolvency proceedings, but provides various ways for which the 
judiciary could avoid giving full effect to the consequences of the recognition.  
The differences between Korea and Japan on one hand, and Australia and 
Singapore on the other hand, relating to the hotchpot rule or rule of payment in 
concurrent proceedings, also reflect the resistance of the civil law countries to 
being brought in line with the common law position. As discussed in Section 
I(B)(7), some of the differences are founded in regulatory philosophy. Both 
Korea and Japan recognize the payments made pursuant to the secured claims 
on the grounds of equality of treatment of creditors but such payments are 
typically excluded at common law. There are also differences in what kinds of 
payments are caught by the rule, such as payments outside the foreign 
insolvency proceedings (as is the case in Japan but not in Australia or 
Singapore). While the differences may not have been presented as significant 
impediments in practice, they nevertheless illustrate the limitations of securing 
harmonization.  
Finally, there is a preference by Korea and Japan to remain silent and not 
explicitly deal with certain areas of law in their respective legislation where the 
legal provisions are unclear. Korea and Japan chose not to adopt the solutions in 
the Model Law, such as those relating to the possible application of foreign law 
on tax and social security claims,172 and the application of foreign law on 
transaction avoidance.173 This indicates that these countries prefer a wait and see 
approach.  
 
 171 See also HALLIDAY and CARRUTHERS, at 238. 
 172 See notes 98-99above. 
 173 See note 104above. 
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR UNCITRAL 
The drafters of the Model Law hoped that the Model Law would simplify 
and harmonize insolvency processes world-wide. However, the differences in 
the way that the Model Law has been implemented in domestic legislation and 
interpreted by local courts demonstrate persistent divergences, even though 
courts and practitioners broadly apply what appears to be general principles. 
These divergences have led UNCITRAL to formulate a recent supplemental 
Model Law addressing the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related 
judgments.174 
In certain cases, the differences are substantive in nature. Drawing from the 
implementation of the Model Law in Australia, Singapore, Japan, and Korea, 
the differences as to how public policy carve-outs from the operation of the 
Model Law (both at a general level and in respect to the discrete issues such as 
protection of local creditors and treatment of foreign creditors) are implemented 
and interpreted act as an impediment to reaching uniformity. The scope of the 
implementing laws on proceedings that are subject to the Model Law also 
differs, depending on the legislative tweaks impacting what are regarded as laws 
relating to insolvency/ collective proceedings. The effects of the recognition of 
foreign insolvency proceedings differs as well, with Japan and Korea departing 
from the basic Model Law norms.  
In other cases, the Model Law is ambiguous on important terms, which is 
likely the result of compromise among the drafters. The kinds of relief available 
to foreign insolvency representatives and the potential application of foreign law 
in the recognising State, including the availability of transaction avoidance 
remedies, are left to be interpreted by the recognising courts. The variations 
oorm the implementation of the hotchpot rule in Japan and Korea may also result 
in uncertainty as to how these provisions will work in practice. 
Yet, there are cases where the differences in the implementation in the Model 
Law may not have much substantive impact. Japan and Korea’s more limited 
provisions on cooperation and court-to-court communication have not precluded 
such cooperation in practice. However, the question still remains as to why they 
have chosen not to adopt the strategies of adopting the Model Law in full, which 
would address the issue of certainty and predictability. 
We argue that the differences result not only from the difference in legal 
 
 174 See generally Adrian Walters, Modified Universalisms & the Role of Local Legal Culture in the Making 
of Cross-border Insolvency Law, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 47 (2019). 
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origins of the States but also from the intentions of the States in signalling their 
intention of compliance. This may impact the practical realizability of the 
UNCITRAL’s initiatives to facilitate cross-border insolvency of enterprise 
groups,175 as well as the recent enhancement of recognition and enforcement of 
insolvency-related judgments. As globalisation becomes more pervasive and 
economically significant countries have groups of companies with ‘member’ 
companies incorporated in different jurisdictions, management of cross-border 
insolvency that benefits debtors, creditors and other stakeholders has become a 
priority. Thus, States have moved away from an exclusively territorialist 
approach and toward modified universalist and judicial approaches that also 
reflect such convergence.176 While the Model Law represents a kind of modified 
universalism, participating countries which traditionally have adopted a more 
exclusively territorialist approach towards cross-border insolvency are more 
likely to require local carve-outs and modifications to be convinced that 
implementation of the Model Law will work in their best interest. Finally, we 
should also mention that there are larger political factors that may also influence 
States in the manner in which they adopt the Model Law. For example, even 
though the common law approach in Canada prior to the adoption of the Model 
Law has been one of modified universalism,177 Canada chose to make significant 
changes in its implementation of the Model Law,178 notably by allowing for 
recognition of a greater number of cases than the strict Model Law 




175See UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency available at 
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-
documents/uncitral/en/mlegi_-_advance_pre-published_version_-_e.pdf (date 
last visited, October 11, 2019 
 176 E.g., Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (of 
Navigator Holdings Pl [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 (per Lord Hoffmann), above; see Chan (former Chief 
Justice of Singapore), supra, note 165. Cf. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, para. 129, where the court 
declined to uphold a new basis for recognition in relation to insolvency proceedings, preferring to rely instead 
on traditional bases for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment.  
 177 See Janis Sarra, Northern Lights, Canada’s Version of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border 
Insolvency, 16 INT. INSOLV. REV. 19 (2007). 
 178 Statutes of Canada, C-47 (2015) 
 179 The definition of foreign non-main proceedings in Chapter 47 differs from the Model Law such that 
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